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THE d e v e l o p m e n t  OF DEMOCRATIC character can be studied from sev­
eral different perspectives, among them cognitive psychology and the 
broader, more general, and interdisciplinary cognitive science. Cognitive 
psychology studies human reasoning and cognition as information pro­
cessing. This processing involves not only such basic mechanisms as how 
we perceive, decode, represent, store, and retrieve information but more 
complex mental phenomena as well, including how we use knowledge in 
a familiar context, how we apply our existing knowledge to novel situa­
tions, how we draw inferences, and how wé make decisions.
In the past few years, spectacular development has taken place in the field 
of learning and instruction, especially in areas influenced by cognitive sci­
ence. Developing democratic character, one of the main aims of schooling, 
cannot be isolated from other processes of teaching. However, research into 
learning and instruction shows little overlapping with the research into 
democracy and education. Therefore, in this chapter I relate these two 
areas of research to show how methods of the cognitive approach can be 
extended and how its results can be applied to the field of democratic 
education.
Since democracy is, in common usage, a political term that is discussed 
in an educational context as mostly related to values and virtues, it is not 
obvious that cognitive science has a relevant message for those who aim 
at developing democratic character. Therefore, I first outline the histori­
cal background of the differentiation of the affective and cognitive
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domains and trace the roots of their integration into unified frameworks. 
Then I discuss some of those cognitive processes that are involved in 
democratic thinking.
Research into social cognition has already identified a number of men­
tal processes that play important roles when we think and make decisions 
in social contexts. However, cognitive research, especially the application 
of its results to education, has continuously been changing our view of 
the values and qualities of knowledge and has been reshaping the meth­
ods that are used in the schools to fulfill their basic missions. Beyond 
transmitting knowledge, other objectives receive growing attention in 
schooling: teaching thinking, improving cognitive abilities, and develop­
ing problem-solving skills, for example. New research provides us with 
theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence to satisfy these aims. These 
new resources also allow us to rethink the consequences of recent changes 
in the study of cognition for developing democratic character. Contem­
porary research suggests a new view of how we form mental representa­
tions of our social environment, accumulate our experiences, build a 
knowledge base about social phenomena that we face in everyday life, 
solve complex problems that involve social relationships, and make deci­
sions in social situations.
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The Relationship of the Cognitive and the Affective
Can we help our students to be more democratic thinkers by cultivating 
their cognitive capacities? Everyday wisdom suggests that being smart 
does not necessarily imply being moral; history has shown us that human 
intelligence can be used for good and bad purposes alike. On the other 
hand, it seems obvious that in order to make good and morally right deci­
sions in situations that we face in a complex society, not only do we have 
to possess knowledge, we also need a number of highly developed social 
and cognitive skills that function smoothly and efficiently together.
This question of the relationship between cognitive and affective char­
acteristics is not new at all. Philosophers and educators attempt to answer 
it from time to time. One of the earliest conceptualizations of this rela­
tionship was put forward by Greek philosophers around two and a half 
millennia ago. Socrates, who represented a firm view of moral intellectu- 
alism, nevertheless considered moral and intellectual virtues one and the 
same. He thought that all virtues were merely forms of scientific knowl­
edge. According to Socrates, no one acts wrongly on purpose; the only 
cause of an immoral action is the lack of proper knowledge and intellec­
tual capacity to find the right action. In short, the one who knows is good.
Not much later, Aristotle clearly differentiated two classes of virtues 
that we today would categorize as the cognitive and affective domains. 
He also distinguished the ways these virtues are acquired: “Virtue, then, 
being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main 
owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which it requires expe­
rience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, 
whence also its name (etbike) is one that is formed by a slight variation 
from the word ethos (habit).” 1
Aristotle not only identified these types of virtues, but he analyzed the 
relationship between them as well. After further differentiating the types 
of virtues and examining their connections, he concluded that moral and 
intellectual virtues mutually suppose each other’s existence. As for the 
moral prerequisites of the cognitive side, he wrote: “Therefore it is evi­
dent that it is impossible to be practically wise without being good.”2 On 
the other side, moral virtues require intellectual foundations: “ It is clear, 
then, from what has been said, that it is not possible to be good in the 
strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral 
virtue. But in this way we may also refute the dialectical argument 
whereby it might be contended that the virtues exist in separation from 
each other.” 3
It is often said that the history of science is mostly an elaboration of 
what Aristotle outlined in his philosophical works. Of course, scientific 
research has accomplished much more than Aristotle could ever have envi­
sioned, but there is at least a morsel of truth in this statement. As for the 
relationship of the affective and cognitive attributes of the personality, his 
instructions may undoubtedly be followed.
After the birth of modern psychology and the educational sciences, sev­
eral theorists working in different paradigms examined the relationships 
between cognitive and affective attributes. Jean Piaget, who devised one 
of the most complex and sophisticated cognitive developmental theories, 
extended his methodology to the study of moral development. He pointed 
out that children’s moral judgment involves a number of cognitive com­
ponents that are characteristic of specific ages.4 Lawrence Kohlberg elab­
orated on this idea, basing his theory of the development of moral 
reasoning on children’s cognitive development.5 William Damon, employ­
ing a slightly different approach, also examined the relationships of rea­
soning and morality.6 These studies and many others have shown that 
cognitive and affective—or moral and intellectual—attributes are closely 
interrelated, and their developmental processes are interdependent.
In schooling, on the other hand, the cognitive and the affective have 
often been separated. Instruction, that is, transmitting knowledge or cul­
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tivating the intellect, historically took place apart from improving morals: 
at different times, in different places, often in different institutions. Such 
frameworks as Bloom’s cognitive taxonomies of educational objectives 
have appeared only recently on the educational scene. Although still sep­
arating the cognitive and affective domains, they treated the goals of both 
in an equal manner, or at least they handled them within the same com­
prehensive system. By offering methods for determining educational objec­
tives more precisely, these taxonomies, despite their shortcomings, opened 
the way for a great deal of improvement in identifying the goals of edu­
cation. And by providing patterns for the operationalization of affective 
goals, they also pointed the way to strengthening the moral side of school­
ing. One of the obstacles to encouraging the development of value sys­
tems in education is that although there is agreement on the importance 
of moral goals, these goals fade away as they are translated into a cur­
riculum and as the curriculum is implemented in educational practice. 
Bloom’s work made it possible to identify the affective goals at the level 
of observable behavior, and thus to monitor the curriculum’s implemen­
tation. Unfortunately, however, the taxonomy of the affective domain was 
completed much later than that of the cognitive domain and has remained 
in the shadows, receiving much less attention and exerting much less influ­
ence than the cognitive taxonomy.7
In general, at the level of theoretical analysis we have to distinguish 
between these two notions under discussion. The cognitive and affective 
domains (or the intellectual and moral) are different enough to be ana­
lyzed and described separately. Furthermore, in the course of empirical 
research, attention may be focused on one or the other. Thus, there is no 
problem with the separation and differentiation if they take place at the 
level of scientific analysis. But results of recent cognitive research also sug­
gest that the different components of democratic character are so closely 
interrelated that their developmental processes cannot be separated.
Democratic Thinking as a Cognitive System
If there exist areas in the study of cognition that are complex and do not 
lend themselves easily to a rational conceptual analysis, democratic think­
ing must be counted among them. However, the framework of today’s 
cognitive psychology offers a variety of approaches, methods, and mod­
els to study human cognition; the continuous shift that is taking place in 
cognitive science, particularly within the cognitive psychology of school 
learning, makes these approaches more and more relevant for the study 
of the development of democratic thinking. These changes, although not
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independent of each other, take place in a number of different directions. 
The emphasis of research is moving from simple to complex, from con­
tent free to content bound, from context independent to context depen­
dent, from individualistic to socially determined, from receptive to 
constructive, from active to interactive attributes of thinking, from direct 
instruction to applying indirect effects, and from teaching to organizing 
influential learning environments.
Earlier paradigms emphasized the universal attributes of thinking, with 
research focusing on its structure and form. These paradigms, ranging 
from the psychometric approach to Piagetian theory, paid little attention 
to the particular attributes of cognition, to its specific content, or to the 
environment in which it takes place. The first models of cognitive psy­
chology considered the computer as the best metaphor of human cogni­
tion. Recent comparative studies, however, have revealed that thinking is 
much less computation-like and much less rational than early frameworks 
suggested. General thinking operations or formal thinking schemes play 
a much less significant role in everyday, real-life problem solving than pre­
viously supposed. Therefore, not only the structure but also the content 
of thinking is significant in determining its efficacy. Furthermore, domain- 
and context-specific thinking patterns are the mental tools that make 
human cognition really efficient.8 These new focuses of cognitive research 
have their consequences for developing democratic thinking as well.
If the content of thinking is more crucial than its structure, then the pos­
sibility of transferring knowledge from one situation into another is lim­
ited. A more general aspect of this issue is the relationship of situation and 
social context. Early cognitive theories focused on the mechanisms of 
knowledge acquisition in pure, laboratory-like situations. Since knowledge 
mastered in such situations—including many school settings—is hardly 
applicable in other, especially real-life, ones, a number of theoretical frame­
works have been proposed to conceptualize this feature of human learn­
ing and cognition. Technically, the theory of situated cognition, as Clancey 
formulates it, “claims that every human thought and action is adapted to 
the environment, that is, situated, because what people perceive, how they 
conceive of their activity, and what they physically do develop together.”9
In a slightly different way, almost the same can be said about the role 
that contexts play in the application of knowledge. A number of studies 
in several domains (many of them dealing with problems in the fields of 
mathematics and science education) indicated that even when problems 
or tasks are well defined and their structures are identical (or isomorphic, 
to use the usual term of cognitive psychology) there may be great differ­
ences in solving these problems, depending very much on how familiar
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the contexts of the problems are. Ceci and Roazzi describe this phenom­
enon as follows:
Transfer of learning across contexts appears to be quite limited. In fact, 
outside the case of those rare individuals who are recognized as bril­
liant, the norm is for subjects not to transfer. Depending on how much 
knowledge one possesses about the theme in question, and the social 
implications of various aspects of the physical context, cognitive 
processes will be deployed with differential efficiency.
The failure to transfer learning from one context to another is per­
vasive, including both the young and old, educated and uneducated, 
and high and low IQ. . . . Based on the available research, it appears 
that even those students at good universities who take ample science, 
statistics, and math courses do not transfer the principles they learn in 
these courses to novel contexts.10
If this pessimistic account is true for mathematics and the sciences, 
where the structure of knowledge is more transparent and students spend 
hundreds of hours of concentrated effort to master the subjects, what can 
we say about the social studies? In the social sciences and the humanities, 
knowledge is much less well structured, and general principles are often 
hidden or overshadowed by incidental elements. There are more subjec­
tive components involved, and facts can be interpreted from many differ­
ent points of view.
In our everyday lives, we learn patterns that differ from situation to sit­
uation. Politeness, for example, and the customs of good manners are con­
text and situation specific to a great extent. We are socialized to behave 
in very different ways even in basically similar situations. Our decisions 
are influenced by particular rather than general attributes of interpersonal 
relationships. Academic school settings, peer groups, families, and work­
places offer different social environments in which to interact with others 
or to solve problems that involve other persons. In these environments, 
we even use different languages to negotiate and discuss issues or just to 
describe and communicate our experiences. We may well ask again 
whether these different settings facilitate the development of the same 
thinking schemes. Can the skills acquired in one of these situations be eas­
ily applied in another? To answer this question, let us consider what 
research says about the process of gathering experiences, representing and 
storing knowledge in memory, and retrieving and using that knowledge.
There is always a temptation to describe the acquisition of personal 
knowledge by using the model of how the sciences accumulate scientific
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knowledge. However, in spite of inevitable parallels in these processes, the 
components of the fine mechanisms are rather different. Scientific inves­
tigations are collective efforts; use a number of different resources, tools, 
and equipment; may aim at discovering the deeper structures of the exam­
ined phenomena; and construct general, formal models. In contrast, in 
our personal processes of accumulating experiences, what we first per­
ceive are the surfaces of phenomena, and since we lack the resources and 
instruments of digging deeper, we usually represent and store in our minds 
what we have found at the surface.
This is especially apparent in social cognition, the process by which we 
gather experiences about our social environment. Cognitive psychology 
has suggested a number of conceptions, such as schemes and frames, to 
name and describe those larger units of meaning that can be identified in 
our organized body of knowledge. In the field of social cognition, stories 
are among such larger units or building blocks of our knowledge. Roger C. 
Shank has advanced one of the most well-known and most radical (and 
therefore most disputed) views of the role of stories in organizing knowl­
edge. He claims that almost all of our social knowledge is represented in 
the form of stories.11 Others, taking broader and less radical perspectives, 
argue for the relevance of a number of personalized storylike construc­
tions that have been identified in several fields of research. Such con­
structions as narratives, accounts, autobiographies, and scripts indicate a 
convergence of research in social, cognitive, personality, and develop­
mental psychology. As Harvey and Martin explain, “Storylike constructions 
that we call accounts . . . represent the principal grounds for understand­
ing and conveying meaning, generally in social discourse. There would be 
no discourse nor meaning in social acts without the drive and ability to 
construct and report stories.” 12
Since stories are deeply personal constructs, different persons may form 
different stories about the same situation, and since stories for the most 
part capture the surface attributions of a phenomenon, an individual may 
compose different stories about situations that a more thorough analysis 
would describe as identical. For example, a child may construct a story 
about a phenomenon that a researcher may term “accepting others’ point 
of view,” but it may be a story about authority, friendship, or love, 
depending on whether it takes place at school, in a group of peers, or in 
the family. Since there are few coincidences between school experiences 
and those gathered within peer groups or the family, these experiences are 
usually represented as different stories.
In this framework, understanding other people means mapping their 
stories into ours. The impact of broader culture can be taken into account
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by the concept of story skeletons. In every culture there exist a number of 
story skeletons—basic common frames or structures (for example, “The 
teacher does not like my child.” )—and when we are composing our per­
sonal stories, we may tap this common base. This common base offers 
good opportunity for education to influence students’ construction of per­
sonalized stories about, for example, democratic practices. The other side 
of the coin is, again, the impact of diverse incidental peculiarities: there 
are no two identical understandings of the same phenomenon, and per­
sonalized versions of story skeletons may also be very diverse.
A similar construction, the script, can be considered as a common out­
line or generalized essence of stories that take place in identical or simi­
lar situations and therefore is also a relevant concept from an educational 
point of view. “A script is a set of expectations about what will happen 
next in a well-understood situation,” observe Schank and Abelson.13 It is 
a kind of structure of sequential events in which we may know our role 
or how we are supposed to act to make a story happen. Those teaching 
democratic practices might do well to focus on encouraging students to 
acquire the proper scripts.
Taking all this into account, we cannot expect that the principles stu­
dents learn concerning society, social relationships, and democracy or the 
thinking skills they acquire in certain contexts will easily transfer to oth­
ers. Thus, it is obviously not enough for us to teach broad democratic 
ideas in the schools. Children cannot be expected to apply these ideas to 
every specific situation of life; they have to learn these again and again in 
each new case. Or, at least, transfer does not come automatically; it 
requires further learning and practice if the same reasoning operations or 
structures are applied to new contents. For example, students who have 
just mastered a certain form of equality in one context—perhaps a set of 
rules for distributing among themselves some money that they have 
earned together—cannot necessarily apply the same conceptions of equal­
ity or rules of distribution when another type of reward is to be shared, 
such as the possibility of visiting an amusement park. Children may 
understand rules at a concrete level—for example, as thinking about 
money in the first case—and not at a deeper level that involves compre­
hending underlying principles.
If recent research suggests that human cognition is so much less ratio­
nal than we have believed before and if the transfer of knowledge is so lim­
ited, how can we manage our lives at all? How can we use our knowledge 
to solve complex problems? One of the keys to understanding this para­
dox is that in most real-life situations, we base our decisions on experi­
ences resulting from the same or very similar situations. We use particular
information and rely on our tacit knowledge. Instead of transferring gen­
eral skills mastered elsewhere or using “global” knowledge, we use specific 
skills mastered, as it were, at the site of the use.
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Knowledge Base for Democratic Thinking
Discussing the content of thinking, John Dewey wrote over eight decades 
ago: “The material of thinking is not thoughts, but actions, facts, events, 
and the relations of things. In other words, to think effectively one must 
have had, or now have, experiences which will furnish him resources for 
coping with the difficulty at hand.” 14 As Dewey noted, we obviously can­
not think about nothing. Thinking needs a subject. The computer anal­
ogy may help to explain what this may mean in an information-processing 
model. Computer programs process certain types of information: word­
processing programs deal with text, spreadsheets manage data, other pro­
grams process pictures, music, and so on. If it is functionally the analogue 
of software, thinking also requires information to handle. However, 
human information processing does differ from that of computers, espe­
cially when development is also taken into account. Processing mecha­
nisms are attached to the information they process. A bond is formed 
between thinking and the content (domain, situation, context) on which 
it has been executed. In other words, cognitive competencies are domain 
specific and context linked to a great extent. Therefore, if the development 
of democratic thinking aims at expanding its functioning into broad areas 
of the social environment, it needs an adequate knowledge base for prac­
tice. In short, democratic thinking has to be contextualized properly. Its 
supporting knowledge has to be taken from domains that form natural 
subjects of thinking in school and in real-life contexts alike. But what kind 
of knowledge base would best serve democratic thinking? Nothing less 
than the knowledge we need to live in a democratic society.
In complex situations, democratic behavior (that is, democratic acting 
and decision making) requires a broad knowledge that can be obtained 
from several different sources. If the concept of democracy is not limited to 
political processes, and the purpose of education goes beyond reproducing 
the labor force, practically every relevant area of culture has its place in the 
knowledge base that democratic thinking requires.15 However, different 
areas of culture play different roles in such an educational process: some 
may have direct effects, and others may be more indirect. From this analy­
sis, two main domains of knowledge can be distinguished: general knowl­
edge about information from a number of areas required for leading a 
successful life in today’s democratic societies and knowledge required for
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acting in a democratic way in decision-making situations that a person faces 
at both the individual and the social levels.
In traditional school curricula, instruction is organized mostly accord­
ing to the disciplines of the arts and sciences, and the coherence of 
knowledge is derived from each discipline. This setup may be satisfac­
tory if the school intends to train future scientists or disciplinary experts, 
but it does not always fit the purpose of educating citizens. Cultivating 
students’ minds and preparing them to be democratic thinkers requires 
a different logic of organization in education than that required by the 
teaching of the disciplines. In recent decades, researchers have continu­
ously analyzed how school instruction should be changed and how it 
could be better adapted to the cognitive-developmental processes of chil­
dren.16 Instructional innovations aimed at improving the quality of stu­
dents’ knowledge have been organized around topics such as “ teaching 
for understanding.” 17
How instruction should be better adapted to the needs of a democratic 
society has also been a continuous topic in the discourse on renewing edu­
cation. Especially since the publication of Dewey’s influential Democracy 
and Education in 1916, such questions as what democracy precisely means, 
how its attributes can be characterized in an educational context, and how 
educational processes can be tuned to its needs have become major issues. In 
this discourse, several new kinds of curricula have been proposed that draw 
from a wide spectrum of different traditional disciplines and new areas of 
research.18 These curricula that focus on teaching for democracy—if we 
use this paraphrase of “teaching for understanding”—ensure coherence 
through the organization of teaching and learning around the aims of 
educating democratic citizens.
One of the most interesting aspects of Dewey’s works is that he con­
nected cognitive and democratic aspects of education very early.19 
Recently, exciting research has been published that combines these two 
aspects within the latest theoretical frameworks and provides cognitive 
analyses of teaching in several content areas that may significantly con­
tribute to developing democratic character. Particularly noteworthy results 
have been reported in research on science education and social studies. 
For a long time—from Piaget’s experiments until the latest research—con­
ceptual development was characteristically studied through concepts from 
the natural sciences. Science education, especially in some of its current 
approaches, has a prominent place in “teaching for democracy,” but social 
studies offers even broader possibilities. Recent research has proven that 
even the most classical area of social studies, history, can offer a wide 
range of new possibilities to shape students’ society-related conceptual
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frameworks.20 At the same time, researchers have developed and studied 
several concepts related to society and social organization that inevitably 
belong to that core of knowledge required for democratic thinking. In 
contrast to most previous studies that focused on the problems of partic­
ular disciplines, these recent ones approach teaching from a consideration 
of the needs of children’s cognitive development. The development of stu­
dents’ conception, the process of conceptual change, and the interaction 
between development and instruction are among the most promising but 
so far not exhaustively studied topics. As Torney-Purta remarks:
Even with the recent explosion of research on reasoning, two impor­
tant questions concerning adolescents’ thinking about political and 
social issues remain: How do we define conceptual change in the social 
and political domain of knowledge dealing with contemporary politi­
cal events and with historical events? and What is important about 
developmental processes as they intersect with instructional processes 
to influence conceptual change in this domain?21
If the school introduces certain society-related concepts too late or if 
the curricula introduce concepts in a highly abstract, formal, and sterile 
manner, we face a danger. Children’s conceptual development begins ear­
lier and may take a different path than would be desirable; consequently, 
later they remain uninfluenced by school education. Research on science 
misconceptions provides a massive body of evidence on how children’s 
simple generalizations and naive models may differ from the scientific 
knowledge that the school intends to transmit to them. Society, one of the 
most complex subjects of scientific research, seems to be difficult to 
describe in models that fit students’ early developmental levels. Therefore, 
in traditional schools, social studies in the primary grades present simple 
historic stories—if such a field of study exists there at all. Themes that 
demonstrate concepts related to social processes and the structure of soci­
ety are introduced later, and sometimes too late. On the other hand, our 
daily experiences as well as developmental research show that children’s 
understanding of some crucial social concepts emerges very early.
The development of ideas related to society and social organization, 
which are inevitably parts of a knowledge base that democratic thinking 
requires, has recently become part of mainstream cognitive research. And 
instead of exploring how canonized scientific knowledge can be taught, 
research moves closer to children’s real-life learning and developmental 
processes. Delval characterizes this shift as he experienced the change of 
focus in his own research: “For many years we have been studying chil­
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dren’s ideas about different aspects of social institutions. More recently 
we started to look at the ideas they have about how society is structured 
and how they understand social differences and social strata change.”22
Concepts such as possession and ownership are among the first things 
children learn in modern societies, and they gain hands-on experiences 
with money and prices at a very young age. Children may also have expe­
riences that build their understanding of poverty, wealth, profit, and the 
sources of wealth.23 If schools do not deal with these concepts early 
enough and do not help students to elaborate them by encouraging chil­
dren to think about such concepts in a proper context, they may become 
fossilized in a simple or primitive form. Other concepts that extend think­
ing in the moral and democratic dimensions, such as equity and equality, 
which seem abstract but are nevertheless vital for democratic thinking, 
should also be involved very early in money- or economy-related think­
ing and should be associated inseparably with the other more materialis­
tic and easily accessible conceptions.
Developmental research has also shown that children’s conceptual frame­
work of the organization of society emerges early. Some basic concepts— 
for example, social contract—are rooted in children’s everyday experiences 
or originate from the family or peer groups. Others are shaped mostly by 
formal education: for example, the state, state formation, government, 
and law. But studies also point out that in school instruction, even such 
crucial concepts are not always properly treated. High school students 
may face difficulties when asked to interpret sociopolitical concepts such 
as reform, civil rights, or social class. At best, most of them can mention 
some examples.24
The changes taking place in science education in these years also drive 
learning closer to the aims of democratic education. The new way of 
thinking is indicated in the discourse about the mission of schooling by 
the replacement of the phrase “teaching of physics, chemistry, and biol­
ogy” with “ science education.” The aim to provide future citizens with a 
broad scientific literacy is demonstrated by projects that are organized 
around the concepts of “science for all students,” “everyday science,” and 
“home science.” All of these highlight the intention that general and com­
pulsory schooling should concentrate on relevant, socially valid knowl­
edge, while the transmittal of disciplinary knowledge may be left to the 
special training of future experts.25
There seems to be international agreement about this orientation of 
science education. Documents of international organizations, as well as 
theoretical frameworks of large-scale international assessment endeav­
ors, emphasize the role of scientific literacy in the democratic operation
of the society as a facilitator of decision making. For example, in the 
Programs for International Student Assessment (PISA) project that aims 
to assess students’ knowledge every three years in Organization for Eco­
nomic Cooperation and Development countries, scientific literacy is 
defined as “ the capacity to use scientific knowledge, to identify ques­
tions and to draw evidence-based conclusions in order to understand 
and help make decisions about the natural world and the changes made 
to it through human activity.”26 And later, when the decision-making ele­
ment is elaborated, the document highlights the importance of contexts 
and values:
The phrase understand and help make decisions indicates first, that 
an understanding of the natural world is valued as a goal in itself as 
well as being necessary for decision making and, second, that scien­
tific understanding can contribute to, but rarely determines, decision 
making. Practical decisions are always set in situations having social, 
political or economic dimensions and scientific knowledge is used in 
the context of human values related to these dimensions. Where 
there is agreement about the values in a situation, the use of scien­
tific evidence can be non-controversial. Where values differ, the 
selection and use of scientific evidence in decision making will be 
more controversial.27
Thus, as exemplified in the PISA framework, a knowledge base is a nec­
essary but not sufficient contribution to decision making. Decisions are 
always made in specific contexts. Since it is not always ensured that stu­
dents can transfer their knowledge from one context to another, a num­
ber of new, integrated areas of research and fields of study have been 
emerging to help students study science in a social decision-making con­
text. For example, science-technology-society (STS) courses integrate sci­
entific knowledge, its transfer to technology, and the impact of both on 
society. Citizenship science organizes science knowledge to correspond 
more directly to the need to make decisions in simple, personal, everyday 
situations (for example, choosing recyclable materials or using renewable 
sources of energy) and to take a stand and vote on large-scale economic 
and political issues (building highways or airports, protecting nature, pre­
serving biodiversity, taxing the tobacco industry, subsidizing research on 
alternative energy sources or less-polluting technologies, and so forth). 
Other educational programs bring in even broader problems like sustain­
able development or the global consequences of air pollution. (See also 
Chapter Five.)
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Skills for Democratic Thinking
Regarding the operational or procedural aspects of democratic thinking, 
it must be stressed again that thinking itself, without the adequate con­
tent, does not necessarily help one to make democratic decisions. Think­
ing has to be contextualized; it has to operate in the appropriate 
situations. Continuing in this vein, for democratic thinking to be prac­
ticed, the social context requires the use of certain skills. Although every 
thinking process may be relevant in a way, some skills are more directly 
related to democratic thinking than are others.
Critical thinking may be the form of thinking that has received the most 
scholarly attention in the past half century, and it is quite closely associ­
ated With citizenship education. Some cognitive scientists have considered 
it the thinking process most vital to citizenship because it helps one to 
evaluate every piece of information and, especially, to resist political 
manipulation and ideological indoctrination.28 For a long time, and for 
the lay public in particular, critical thinking meant little more than a 
healthy skeptical attitude, a generally critical disposition toward every­
thing. Those who aim at a more precise technical definition still sketch a 
very broad set of thinking skills that include a number of inductive and 
deductive processes. For example, Halpern contends:
Critical thinking is the use of those cognitive skills or strategies that 
increase the probability of a desirable outcome. It is used to describe 
thinking that is purposeful, reasoned, and goal directed—the kind of 
thinking involved in solving problems, formulating inferences, calcu­
lating likelihoods, and making decisions when the thinker is using 
skills that are thoughtful and effective for the particular context and 
type of thinking task. Other definitions include the notions that critical 
thinking is the formation of logical inferences . . . ,  the development of 
cohesive and logical reasoning patterns . . . , and careful and deliber­
ate determination of whether to accept, reject, or suspend judgment.29
Perhaps the concepts connoted by “to accept, reject, or suspend judg­
ment” are the most specific attributes of critical thinking, but these are 
still too general to make it easily identifiable. Recent research on cogni­
tion is more precise when identifying thinking skills relevant to process­
ing information in social contexts. For example, categorization, 
generalization, probabilistic and correlational reasoning, logical opera­
tions (processing and comprehending the deep logical structures of verbal 
expressions), and causal inferences are among the skills that play an
important role in social cognition. Many of these have been studied by 
social psychologists for a long time. As Wilkes notes about thinking 
processes described as relevant in other areas,
We can expect the same basic processes that were involved there to be 
equally central in social cognition. However, they are labeled differ­
ently. Categorization comes under the heading of social stereotyping; 
reasoning comes in the form of social attribution; and knowledge 
updating appears in various guises including impression formation, 
attitude change, and persuasion. The research parallels are real and 
substantial and they reflect large-scale borrowings by social psychol­
ogists from methods and explanations that were first developed in the 
cognitive laboratory.30
Nevertheless, the parallels between cognition in different domains need 
more and careful clarification. The role of situation and context also must 
be taken into account here, as Wilkes continues:
The extent of this borrowing would seem to corroborate the widely 
held view that individually derived cognitive models can be adapted 
(with some local changes) to cover the full range of social cognitive 
phenomena. Perhaps so, but there are other, more radical opinions that 
have set out to unsettle or, indeed, sever this dependent relationship.31
Indeed, it is hard to suppose that stereotyping or forming prejudices 
can be considered simple cognitive problems or that negative social phe­
nomena can be attributed to a lack of elaborated cognitive skills. If a 
child’s bicycle is stolen and the thief turns out to belong to a minority or 
to another ethnic group, the negative judgment about the thief can easily 
be generalized to his or her entire group, and in this way to every other 
individual with the same particular characteristic, especially if there are 
more such cases in that particular group. Although it is easy to point out 
where the child in this example errs, where the logical mistake is in the 
inference, this is obviously not a pure reasoning mistake. We do not make 
such generalizations with green-eyed or brown-haired people—partly 
because green-eyed or brown-haired people usually are not perceived as 
groups, and partly because other information received from other sources 
also influences the thinking process. Hints received from the social envi­
ronment suggesting how people may be categorized and how events may 
be interpreted affect or, in most cases, even substitute for our inferences. 
We rely on the simple explanations we receive from others rather than on
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complicated logical inferences.32 Therefore, it is clear that prejudices, 
chauvinism, and other antidemocratic behaviors cannot universally be 
overcome by shaping reasoning.
Still, a higher level of social understanding cannot be reached without 
the development of the underlying thinking mechanisms. For example, the 
control of variables plays an important role in cognition, as Piaget demon­
strated in experiments involving simple mechanical tasks. Children learn 
to identify and separate variables and then determine their roles in a phe­
nomenon. A naive thinker, for example, considers a pendulum to be a sin­
gle entity. A step toward understanding why different pendulums swing 
with different tempos (the dependent variable) is to identify that the length 
of the string and the weight of the ball that hangs on it are two variables. 
Then, after guessing (hypothesis formation) and trying different settings 
(experimenting, hypothesis testing, and verification), the child learns that 
the length of the string in fact determines the pendulum’s period of swing­
ing. Social phenomena are much more complex than this, but under­
standing them requires basically similar mechanisms and insights. When 
thinking about a social phenomenon, such as law-breaking frequencies, 
one must separate variables such as ethnic group membership and socio­
economic status in order to identify their roles. Hands-on experiments in 
this case are excluded; the nature of this phenomenon is probabilistic 
rather than deterministic, and even if a child has already learned to con­
trol the variables in other contexts, this scheme cannot automatically be 
transferred to such a situation.
Poor reasoning skills block the development of democratic thinking and 
may hinder school education in its efforts to develop democratic charac­
ter, especially in those cases when educational techniques assume, and 
their success requires, highly developed cognition. Someone who does not 
have the cognitive apparatus to process the presented information also 
lacks the alternative to form a cognitively understood model about the 
given phenomenon. If it does not provide children with the appropriate 
skills, education loses its means to shape or even influence children’s moral 
development.
In teaching thinking, there are two main paradigms. One includes the 
stand-alone programs that attempt to teach thinking skills in separate 
courses. Although a plethora of such programs have been developed and 
implemented,33 little evidence exists that they have long-term effects on 
intellectual development. As for teaching democratic thinking, separate 
courses may be useful, since there is a relevant knowledge base to think 
about (the content of social studies, civic education, citizenship education, 
philosophical and theoretical issues of democracy, and others). A good
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example of this approach with significant implications for developing 
democratic character is Lipman’s work, both his “Philosophy for Chil­
dren” approach and his more general works on the possibilities of devel­
oping thinking.34
The other approach to teaching thinking, which marks a shift from 
direct instruction to more indirect ways of fostering development, is labeled 
in a number of ways, from the more technical terms (integration, synthe­
sis) to the more visual ones that move the imagination, like embedding, 
infusion, or even infiltration. These approaches take into account that most 
of our thinking skills are context bound and do not transfer easily to new 
domains. Therefore, multiple access of skills and thinking processes can be 
ensured only if they are mastered in multiple contexts, that is, if the same 
or similar skills are practiced in several different situations. Recent publi­
cations propose that if we expect long-term effects, thinking should be 
taught in a number of different school subjects across the curriculum. This 
has led to the concept of the thinking curriculum, which suggests that rel­
evant thinking skills should be taught in as many subjects as possible.35
The embedding technique, or teaching thinking within subject-matter 
areas, has already been implemented in several domains and for the improve­
ment of several thinking skills and processes.36 However, since designing 
such educational programs demands competencies from many different 
domains, and implementing them at school requires coordinated efforts, its 
full potential in school is still to be seen. So far, improvement efforts have 
been concentrated mostly on simple, easily identifiable thinking opera­
tions (for example, integrated science courses offer a good area for prac­
ticing such skills),37 but there are promising attempts to expand the focus 
on thinking to cover the whole spectrum of school subjects.38
On asking them for the first time, the questions “How can democratic 
thinking be taught across the curriculum?” and “How can thinking oper­
ations relevant for democratic thinking be embedded in a number of 
school subjects?” sound a bit startling. Yet the opportunities to integrate 
democratic thinking and subject matter can be found in abundance. 
Although it may sound absurd, even mathematics lessons can be used for 
this purpose. For example, when proportion is taught, students may cal­
culate the proportion of people with different ethnic backgrounds on the 
city council, in the state legislature, or in Congress and compare the results 
to their respective proportions in the local, state, or national population. 
Another example of proportional reasoning might be to compute the dis­
tribution of income in a country over several social groups.
The concept of probability and correlation can also be taught and con­
textualized with social examples. Through comparing proportions in
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delinquency and income, students will understand not only mathematics 
but also something of the nature of correlational relationships in a social 
context. When students learn how to read multidimensional data tables, 
these tables may contain relevant social statistics; when they learn how to 
depict data on charts, they may depict, for example, the changes in the 
proportion of women attending college over a span of years, and so forth. 
With some comments and interpretation of the processed information, 
there is an authentic context to shape students’ democratic thinking.
The sciences too offer a number of possibilities. For example, when stu­
dents study carbon dioxide, they may learn about its impact on the envi­
ronment and its contribution to the greenhouse effect and climate change. 
Although in many chemistry programs students already do this, they could 
go still further and study the figures of the carbon dioxide production of 
some countries, then compute per capita figures and compare them. In this 
way, they would also learn why studying chemistry is relevant, practice 
their proportional reasoning, and receive a moral message from the sphere 
of global environmental issues. Of course, exercises of this kind may take 
away some time from learning the core disciplinary knowledge, but what 
is learned in this way is learned better and for a longer and broader use.
Broader Contexts of Developing Democratic Thinking
The “ learning for schools or for life?” dilemma is still alive. Since schools 
provide students with artificial environments, it is not obvious that school 
knowledge can be applied to real-life activities. Dewey described this 
problem as follows:
As a consequence of the absence of the materials and occupations which 
generate real problems, the pupil’s problems are not his; or, rather, they 
are his only as a pupil, not as a human being. Hence the lamentable 
waste in carrying over such expertness as is achieved in dealing with 
them to the affairs of life beyond the schoolroom. A pupil has a prob­
lem, but it is the problem of meeting the peculiar requirements set by 
the teacher. His problem becomes that of finding out what the teacher 
wants, what will satisfy the teacher in recitation and examination and 
outward deportment. Relationship to subject matter is no longer direct.
The occasions and material of thought are not found in the arithmetic 
or the history or geography itself, but in skillfully adapting that mate­
rial to the teacher’s requirements. The pupil studies, but unconsciously 
to himself the objects of his study are the conventions and standards of 
the school system and school authority, not the nominal “studies.” The
thinking thus evoked is artificially one-sided at the best. At its worst, 
the problem of the pupil is not how to meet the requirements of school 
life, but how to seem to meet them—or, how to come near enough to 
meeting them to slide along without an undue amount of friction. The 
type of judgment formed by these devices is not a desirable addition 
to character.39
If school processes are so distant from the needs of students’ optimal 
development in the more neutral teaching materials, they are even more 
so when a sensitive issue that shapes students’ democratic thinking is con­
sidered. Taking another perspective, a developmental one, Torney-Purta 
writes when comparing experiences inside and outside school:
Instructional experience in the classroom can be contrasted with devel­
opmental experience. Developmental experience is rich in levels of mean­
ing and social context, in redundancy as the same topics are visited and 
revisited, in opportunities to respond to others’ ideas and to get their 
feedback, and in chances to construct a group identity and to experi­
ence loyalty. Instructional experience in the social studies classroom is 
more likely to be narrowly focused on facts, lean on context and con­
nection, moving rapidly among topics, lacking opportunities to voice 
opinions without risking potential censure, and to be generalized to 
reach all students rather than responsive to a group identity or set of 
interests. Developmental experience is situated for child and adolescent 
in a meaningful context, often within the peer group or family or neigh­
borhood. Instructional experience usually lacks such a context.40
Because of the differences between schools and “real life,” it is clear 
that schools alone will never be able to do a perfect job of providing stu­
dents with socially relevant and usable knowledge. This problem is not 
new, but recently a number of radical and unrealistic alternatives—from 
deschooling society to home teaching—have been proposed to solve it. 
Nevertheless, in modern societies, there are hardly any other viable alter­
natives to mass education than public schooling. Public schooling can be 
made more “lifelike” in two major ways: by bringing as many real-life 
processes into school as possible and by extending educational processes 
beyond the walls of school by encompassing more outside experiences.
If we consider what kinds of social practices relevant to social activity 
and related to democratic thinking should be transferred into the school, 
collaborative processes will most definitely be among them. In today’s 
societies, the number of workplaces in which members of a group col­
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laborate in ways that involve the extensive exchange of information is sig­
nificantly growing. Since democratic thinking is practiced in social situa­
tions, implementing educational processes that foster democratic thinking 
is not only socially relevant but also reflective of real life. For a number 
of reasons, in the early 1990s collaborative processes became among the 
most extensively studied areas in learning and instruction.41
Several instructional processes that foster democratic thinking have 
already become part of mainstream education. For example, cooperative 
learning, group projects, modeling, and role playing offer more possibili­
ties for practicing democratic thinking skills than teacher-dominated, 
frontal classroom work.42 Recently, a number of new and refreshing ideas 
have appeared that may reshape these educational practices. One of them 
is the concept of distributed cognition, which reconfirms social and col­
laborative aspects of accumulating knowledge.43 When implemented in 
the classroom appropriately, it constitutes a realistic model of students’ 
future life situations, as Brown and colleagues write:
We argue that schools should be communities where students learn to 
learn. In this setting teachers should be models of intentional learning 
and self-motivated scholarship, both individual and collaborative. . . .
If successful, graduates of such communities would be prepared as life­
long learners who have learned how to learn in many domains. We 
aim to produce a breed of “ intelligent novices” . . . , students who, 
although they may not possess the background knowledge needed in a 
new field, know how to go about gaining that knowledge. . . . Ideally, 
in a community of learners, teachers and students serve as role models 
not only as “owners” of some aspects of domain knowledge, but also 
as acquirers, users, and extenders of knowledge in the sustained, ongo­
ing process of understanding.44
The search for authentic content and activities for school learning may 
never end because society—the “real life” outside school—is continuously 
changing. Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, research and school 
practice alike quickly reflect these rapid changes—sometimes too rapidly. 
For example, recent developments in computer and information technol­
ogy find their place in the school in connecting collaborating students and 
make it possible, without any exaggeration, to distribute components of 
cognition over the globe.
Turning to the other possibility of bringing education closer to real 
life—that is, extending formal learning beyond the school walls—the roles 
of families, peer groups, and other communities must be taken into
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account. The parts that communities play in education have recently been 
examined from a number of different perspectives.45 Families and other 
communities outside school are often proposed as fertile fields for chil­
dren’s educational experiences, but they are not always the best examples 
for democratic practice. Therefore, studies that examine empirically how 
and under what circumstances family and community shape students’ 
democratic thinking become particularly important.
In a series of both theoretically and methodologically sophisticated 
studies, Jacqueline Goodnow examined how people experience, interpret, 
and form expectations about household activities. The household work 
setting is the one that, for many children, offers the first context for think­
ing about some basic rules of a democratic community—for example, 
what each person should do in the home, what fairness means, how 
unpleasant chores should be shared, what incentives should be applied, 
how the work should be controlled and monitored, and how and when 
sanctions should be used. From these studies Goodnow created a general 
theoretical framework that, along with the methods devised in this con­
text, can be applied to other work settings as well.46
Another study examined the developmental roots of the social contract 
in a cross-cultural comparative project in seven countries. As Flanagan and 
colleagues outlined the aims of the project, “Becoming a citizen, assuming 
the rights and responsibilities of membership in a social group, is a marker of 
attaining adult status in many societies. But what prepares people to assume 
those responsibilities? How do they come to understand and exercise their 
civic rights? What motivates them to become engaged in civil society?”47
Data collection took place in both industrialized countries with estab­
lished democracies and countries from Eastern and Central Europe with 
political and economic systems still in transition. These settings offered 
insights into the differences in the development of civic identity that can be 
attributed to differences in the social environment as well as the consistent 
features that could be observed across countries. This survey also inves­
tigated how adolescents think about certain civic issues—for example, 
what importance they attribute to contributing to their communities, con­
tributing to their society or country, helping the less fortunate, protecting 
the environment, and being active in politics. Interestingly, adolescents 
assigned the highest priority to environmental issues and then to their 
intentions to do something for their society or country. They attached low 
importance to political activism.
These studies in general also show the significance of family and imme­
diate community in shaping students’ democratic thinking. Nevertheless, 
for successful democratic thinking, all of the factors discussed in this chap­
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ter have to work together smoothly: affective and cognitive attributes, 
processes and content of thinking, individual and collaborative processes, 
and within-school and outside-school experiences alike. Schools provide a 
unique opportunity to educate commonly, but to assume that they are suf­
ficient for the challenge of developing democratic character in the young 
is to ignore the complexities of the task portrayed in this book.
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